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Abstract
Traders in a market typically have widely different, private infor-
mation on the return of an asset. The equilibrium price of the asset
may reflect this information more accurately if the number of traders
is large enough compared to the number of the states of the world that
determine the return of the asset. We study the transition from mar-
kets where prices do not reflect the information accurately into markets
where it does. In competitive markets, this transition takes place sud-
denly, at a critical value of the ratio between number of states and
number of traders. The Nash equilibrium market behaves quite differ-
ently from a competitive market even in the limit of large economies.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental hypothesis, which is typically adopted in financial eco-
nomics, is that markets are efficient. This general hypothesis has been
recently the object of a detailed, critical evaluation (see for instance [2]),
nevertheless it remains an extremely useful benchmark. Many possible def-
initions of this hypothesis have been given. We shall adopt here the one
suggested by Malkiel [6]: A market is efficient with respect to an informa-
tion set if the public revelation of that information would not change the
prices of the securities. Loosely speaking, this means that the information
is incorporated into, or reflected by, prices.
The efficiency hypotheses may also differ for the degree, or form of ef-
ficiency. The one we are going to consider here is strong efficiency: The
information set includes the information available to any of the participants
in the market, including private information.
In order to address the issue of efficiency, it is fundamental to understand
how precisely information scattered across different agents is aggregated into
the prices of the assets that are traded in the market. Two fundamental
insights of economic theory go a long way towards addressing this question.
The first insight is that the asymmetric information of different traders
may cause inefficiency of the equilibrium [1], given the strategic incentive
of each agent not to reveal the information he has. The second insight is
that in large markets the distortion produced by the private incentives and
asymmetric information may vanish, because the benefit from the distortion,
as well as the ability to distort, for any single agent may be infinitesimally
small. This second insight makes the concept of market efficiency interesting
and fruitful.
Here we address a specific aspect of the general question of efficiency
of financial markets. How precisely does the size of the market affect effi-
ciency? Or more precisely, how does the relative size of the market compared
to the size of the uncertainty that agents are facing affect efficiency, when
information available is private? The “size of the market” is an unambigu-
ous concept, and is measured by the number of agents. The “size of the
uncertainty” is less commonly used: It is defined here to be the number of
possible states of nature affecting the return of the asset. We address this
question in the context of a simple market, where the price of the asset is
the outcome of market clearing between a total monetary demand and a
fixed supply.
An alternative method, which has been frequently adopted in recent
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years, is the formulation of a precise, detailed description of the price for-
mation process. For instance, the literature of market micro-structure an-
alyzes the process of price formation in concrete markets, with a limited
number of traders, and a well specified, usually sequential series of moves
that ultimately determine the price of the asset. The emphasis is on the
strategic aspects of information revelation through trade, and the role that
institutional details of the market considered play in the process.
This method has provided useful insights in the working of concrete
markets [5]. But as always when one adopts very specific setups, the results
depend in a critical way on the details of the extensive form game. Instead,
we consider here a very simple market. There is only one asset, with a
return that depends on the state of nature. Traders observe an imperfect
signal of the realization of the state, and can then decide how much they
invest in the asset, before the price of the asset is announced. The price of
the asset is then determined to clear the market. Note that the agents must
decide their investment before they know the price for the period, and the
price is determined to equate the total demand equal to the total amount
invested, to a fixed supply. So this model is very similar to the classic model
of Shapley and Shubik [8].
If agents had a complete knowledge of the state, competitive prices would
equal returns in any state. This means that prices would reflect all the
information on the state of nature, i.e. that the market would be efficient.
When agents have only partial information, competitive prices may fail to
equal returns and the market may not be efficient. It will turn out that the
fundamental element for the efficiency is the size of the market compared to
the size of the uncertainty. Therefore we are going to introduce as crucial
parameter the relative size of the market, that is the number of agents in the
market divided by the number of the states of nature. Our first main result
is that the competitive equilibrium of the market becomes efficient suddenly,
once a threshold in relative number of agents and events is crossed.
The second question we analyze is the size of the difference between
competitive and Nash equilibrium prices. This difference, and in particular
its asymptotic behavior as the number of agents tends to infinity has al-
ready been studied, although in different setups. Particularly relevant from
the point of view of our research are the results that deal with economies
with private information. The typical result is that the difference between
Nash and competitive equilibrium vanishes as the number of agents grows.
The reason for this is clear: with a large number N of agents the effect
of the action of each agent on the aggregate outcome becomes negligible,
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and therefore the incentive to behave differently than an agent in a com-
petitive economy vanishes. The interesting object of study therefore is the
rate of convergence to zero of this difference. This rate depends on the spe-
cific game, and concrete examples yielding different rates have been found.
Two examples may be considered here as an illustration. In the Gul and
Postlewaite paper [3] the rate of convergence is 1√
N
. But in Rustichini,
Satterthwaite and Williams [4] the rate is much faster, and is equal to 1N .
In our model an additional feature enters the analysis: the number of
agents and the size of the uncertainty, modeled by the number of states
of nature, are growing together. We are going to show that the relative
difference of competitive versus Nash equilibrium prices may be non van-
ishing in the limits of large markets. Perhaps more surprisingly, the speed
of convergence depends on the amount of information available, and in a
discontinuous way.
Our results are based on tools and ideas of statistical mechanics of dis-
ordered systems [9]. These same ideas have recently proven quite useful in
the study of systems of heterogeneous interacting agents [10].
2 The model
The model is a simple market with one asset, and many traders. The return
of the asset is determined in each period by the draw of a state of nature.
Agents do not know the state, but observe an imperfect signal on it. After
they observe the signal they have to decide the amount they invest in that
period. The total amount invested, divided by the total supply of the asset,
which is fixed, determines the market-clearing price. Each agent gets then
the return of the asset for each unit he owns, and the market goes to the
next period.
The return in each state, as well as the type of signal available to each
agent, are determined once and for all before the initial period. And now
we proceed to a more detailed exposition.
Asset, returns, and agents
A single asset is being traded over an infinite number of periods in a market
with a set I of N traders. There are N units of asset available. The asset has
a monetary return paid at the end of each period. This return is different
in each period, depends on the state of nature for that period, ω ∈ Ω,
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and is denoted by Rω. The state of nature is determined in each period,
independently, according to the uniform distribution on Ω, which is assumed
to be a finite set1. The value of the return Rω for each state ω is drawn
at random before the first period, and does not change afterwards. Returns
thus only change because the state of nature changes.
Traders do not observe the state directly, but have a signal on the state
according to some fixed private information structure, which is determined
at the initial time and remains fixed. More precisely, a signal is a function
from the state ω ∈ Ω to a signal space, which for simplicity we assume to
be M ≡ {−,+}. The signal observed by trader i if state is ω is kωi . The
information structure available to i is the vector (kωi )ω∈Ω. This structure is
determined, by setting kωi = +1 or −1 with equal probability, independently
across traders i and states ω.
How revealing the information provided by ki is depends, at each state
ω, on the entire realization of the vector, as well as on Rω. If, for example
kωi = + for all ω such that R
ω > R¯ (and kωi = − otherwise), then agent i
will know for sure when the return is higher than R¯. In the random economy
we consider, this is a very unlikely situation, because Rω and kωi are drawn
independently. Still for agent i the distribution of returns conditional on the
signal he receives, will depend to some extent on the signal. Note that an
agent who knew simultaneously the partial information of all agents would
be able to know the state ω, with probability one, for N → ∞. Indeed
the probability that there are two states ω and ω′ with different returns and
that no agent can distinguish them is well approximated by Ω(Ω−1)2−(N+1),
which vanishes for N →∞, even if Ω grows proportionally to N as we shall
assume later.
So if the information available to each single agent happened to be re-
vealed to all, then prices would be equal to return, for all states but a subset
of states with measure tending to zero. This is what the strong efficiency
hypothesis would require in our model.
The market
At the beginning of each period each trader decides to “invest” a monetary
amount zmi in the asset, depending on the signal m = k
ω
i which agent i
receives at that time. The total amount invested by all the agents is the
demand of the asset, and the supply is fixed to N . The market clearing
1We shall use Ω also to denote the number of elements of Ω.
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condition determines the price pω for the period, according to:
∑
i∈I
∑
m∈M
zmi δkωi ,m = p
ωN (1)
where δi,j is the Kronecker delta. When agents decide their investment z
m
i ,
they do not know the price at which they will buy the asset. Note that the
price depends on the state since the amount invested by each agent depends
on the state [8]. At the end of the period, each unit of asset pays a monetary
amount Rω. If agent i has invested zmi units of money, he will hold z
m
i /p
ω
units of asset, so his payoff will be zmi (
Rω
pω − 1).
The expected payoff of agent i is described by a function ui of the entire
vector of investments, as follows:
ui(zi, z−i) =
1
Ω
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
m∈M
δkωi ,mz
m
i
(
Rω
pω
− 1
)
=
∑
m∈M
δki,mz
m
i
(
R
p
− 1
)
, (2)
where for any real valued function f defined on Ω,
f ≡ 1
Ω
∑
ω∈Ω
fω
and z−i denotes the strategy vector of all players but i. The goal of each
agent i is to maximize the expected value of ui.
Agents can, if they want, invest an infinite amount in a period. For
simplicity we exclude the possibility that they can sell an infinite amount,
since this would complicate the market clearing condition if we insist that
the price of the asset has to be positive. The results of this paper hold if
we first require that investment are less than a maximum amount, and then
take the limit in which this bound tends to infinity.
Large markets
We shall be interested in the behavior of the market in the limit when
N → ∞. For the limit to be non-trivial limit, we need to discuss how
different parameters of the model behave in the limit2.
If returns are on average larger than prices, agents will tend to invest
more. This in turn drives prices up towards returns. We then expect that
2We write as usual xn = O(yn) for two sequences {xn} and {yn} if for two positive
constants c and C, c ≤ xn
yn
≤ C for all n sufficiently large. Also we write ≃ for relations
which hold almost surely as N →∞.
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average price p will converge to the average return R and that the fluctua-
tions of prices with ω will adjust to those of Rω. The information structure
however constrains the fluctuations of prices. A simple argument shows that
price fluctuations are small: Note that one can write
zmi =
z+i + z
−
i
2
+m
z+i − z−i
2
for m = ±1. Then for Ω large, ki ≃ 0 and ki kj ≃ δi,j and one easily finds
that
p ≃ 1
N
∑
i∈I
z+i + z
−
i
2
and
(p − p)2 ≃ 1
N2
∑
i∈I
(
z−i − z−i
2
)2 ∝ 1
N
. (3)
A non-trivial behavior is then expected when returns have fluctuations
of a comparable size. Therefore we assume that returns have the specific
form:
Rω = R+
R˜ω√
N
(4)
where R > 0 and R˜ω is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance σ2.
In particular we are interested in the transition to an efficient market,
where information about returns is incorporated into prices, i.e. pω = Rω.
This is a set of Ω equations in 2N unknown zmi . In order to allow for
the possibility of observing the transition from an inefficient to an efficient
market, we need to take a number of states Ω which is proportional to N .
Hence we define α = Ω/N .
The key quantity we shall be interested in is the distance between vectors
in RΩ, such as prices and returns, which is defined as usual
|x− y| =
√∑
ω∈Ω
(xω − yω)2,
for all x, y ∈ RΩ.
Finally note that the parameter R can be set to 1, without loss of gen-
erality, by a suitable choice of the units of zmi . A value R 6= 1 can be
reintroduced at any stage of the calculation by means of dimensional anal-
ysis. This leaves us with only two control parameters α and σ in the limit
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N → ∞. Note now that, with our choices of parameters, the distance of
returns from their average is finite: |R− 1|2 ≃ ασ2.
Of course real markets have a finite, but large, number N of agents
and finite, but small, fluctuations of returns. As we shall see numerical
simulations of finite, but large, economies are in perfect agreement with the
results for N →∞.
Competitive equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
We are going to consider two equilibrium concepts for our market, compet-
itive equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. Both give a description of what
each agent does as a function of the signal observed. In the competitive
equilibrium, each agent ignores the effect he has on the price. In the Nash
equilibrium traders take their effect on prices into account. Here are the
more precise definitions.
A competitive equilibrium is a vector (zmi )i∈I,m∈M such that:
1. for every i and m,
zmi ∈ argmax
x≥0
xδki,m
(
R
p
− 1
)
2. market clears at pω, i.e. Eq. (1) holds.
Note that if the expected net return δki,m
(
R
p − 1
)
is positive then the trader
invests an infinite amount when receiving signal m.
A Nash Equilibrium is a vector (zmi )i∈I,m∈M such that:
1. for every i and m,
zmi ∈ argmax
x≥0
x
∑
ω∈Ω
δkiω(m)
(
Rω
pω−i + x/N
− 1
)
where pω−i = p
ω −∑m∈M δkωi ,mzmi /N is the contribution of all other
agents to the price.
2. market clears at pω, i.e. Eq. (1) holds.
The difference between a competitive equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium
usually vanishes as N → ∞. It is easy to check this when agents have no
information (for instance, when kωi = +1, ∀i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω). In this case price
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cannot depend on ω. The competitive equilibrium price, pC is equal to the
expected return:
pC = R
while the Nash equilibrium prices are
pN =
(
1− 1
N
)
R
In this case the distance in RΩ between the two prices vanishes as 1/
√
N ,
for N →∞. Note that the difference pC − pN ∝ 1/N is much smaller than
fluctuations of returns, which vanish as 1/
√
N . We are going to see that,
for a random information structure kωi , the difference p
ω
C−pωN is generally of
order 1√
N
. In particular it is of the same order of the fluctuations in returns.
We shall also see that the nature of the two states is quite different.
Learning to trade
We also consider boundedly rational agents who repeatedly trade in the
market. Each agent i has a propensity to invest Umi (t) for each of the signals
m ∈M . His investment zmi = χi(Umi ) at time t is an increasing function of
Umi (t) (χi : R→ R+) with χi(x)→ 0 if x→ −∞ and χi(x)→∞ if x→∞.
After each period agents update Umi (t) according to the marginal success of
the investment:
Umi (t+ 1) = U
m
i (t) + Γ
∂uωi
∂zmi
(5)
where uωi =
∑
m∈M δkωi ,mz
m
i
(
Rω
pω − 1
)
is the payoff received in state ω invest-
ing a quantity z+i or z
−
i depending on k
ω
i [7]. As we did with the distinction
between competitive equilibrium and Nash equilibrium, we distinguish be-
tween naive (or price takers) and sophisticated agents. The first do not take
into account their impact on the price and hence take the partial deriva-
tive in Eq. (5) at fixed pω. The latter, instead, account for the fact that if
zmi → zmi +dz also the price pω changes by an infinitesimal amount and this
gives a contribution to the partial derivative in Eq. (5).
3 Results
The study of markets’ equilibria and of the asymptotic properties of the
learning dynamics for N →∞, turns into the analysis of the minima of the
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Hamiltonian function
Hη = |R− p|2 + η α
N
∑
i∈I
z+i
2
+ z−i
2
2
(6)
with η = 0 for competitive equilibria or naive agents, and η = 1 for Nash
equilibria or sophisticated agents. The first term of Hη (i.e. H0) is just the
squared distance between prices and returns. The competitive equilibrium
prices and the Nash equilibrium prices minimize the Hamiltonian. A detailed
proof of this fact shall be presented elsewhere [11]. Here we offer a brief
description of the main steps leading to it. We also present evidence from
numerical simulations to illustrate our conclusions. First we observe that,
given that pω −Rω = O(1/√N) is small, one can linearize the equations in
pω 3. Finding equilibria becomes then a linear optimization problem which
can be cast into the minimization of Hη.
The learning dynamics can also be linearized, leading to
Umi (t+ 1) = U
m
i (t) + Γδkωi ,m
[
(Rω − pω)− ηz
m
i
N
]
. (7)
Here η = 0 describes price takers or naive agents whereas η = 1 describes
sophisticated agents. Indeed the term zmi /N arises exactly from a derivative
∂pω
∂zmi
of price with respect to investment. The dynamics (7), in the limit
Γ → 0, turns into4 a deterministic dynamics in continuum time. Hη is a
Lyapunov function of this dynamics which implies that the asymptotic state
is described by the minima of Hη.
Hη is a non-negative definite quadratic form of the dynamical variables
(zmi )i∈I,m∈M . This means that there is a single minimum (which is either a
single point or a connected set).
In order to study the properties of the minima of Hη, we resort to tools of
statistical mechanics. Hη depends on the particular realization of the of two
random variables: the random information structure kωi and of the returns
Rω. In the language of statistical mechanics, these two random variables
represent the disorder in our system. However, in the limit N → ∞, the
3E.g. Rω/pω − 1 ≃ (Rω − pω)/R¯, where again ≃ means that we are neglecting terms
which vanish at least as N−1/2 relative to the one retained.
4The idea is to consider a time interval ∆t = dτ/Γ where dτ is small but much larger
than Γ. Then Umi (t + ∆t) − U
m
i (t) can be estimated to linear order in dτ using the law
of large numbers for ∆t→∞ as Γ→ 0.
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Figure 1: Distance |p −R| = √∑ω(pω −Rω)2 of prices from returns in the
competitive (full line and diamonds) and Nash equilibria (dashed line and
squares). Full lines and dashed lines present the analytical graphs; diamonds
and squares trace the numerical simulations of systems with N = 200 agents
and small learning rates. Averages are taken over 100 realizations of the
disorder in the stationary state.
statistical behavior is independent of the specific realization of the disorder5.
Averages over the disorder are handled by the replica method of statistical
mechanics [9], which is briefly discussed in the appendix. A similar analysis
for a system of interacting heterogeneous adaptive agents has been carried
out, with the same techniques, in Ref. [10]. Below we discuss the results
in the two cases of competitive or Nash equilibria as a function of the two
parameters α and σ.
Equilibria and the transition to efficient markets
In the competitive equilibrium agents minimize the distance between prices
and returns. As the number of agents increases, i.e. as α = Ω/N decreases,
agents are collectively more efficient in driving prices close to returns. Indeed
5This statement applies to some of the observables, which are called self-averaging.
Typically the average value
∑
i
Oi/N of a quantity Oi defined for each agent i is self-
averaging (i.e. attain a.s. a fixed value) by virtue of the law of large numbers when
N →∞. We refer to ref. [9] for further discussion.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram for competitive markets in the (s, α) plane. The
curve αc(s) (full line) separates the efficient (α < αc) from the inefficient
(α > αc) phase. For α− < α < α+ agents invest at most once, whereas for
α > α+ or α < α− agents invest a positive amount under both signals.
the distance |R − p| decreases as α decreases, as shown in Fig. 1. The
distance vanishes at a critical point αc which marks a second order phase
transition, in the statistical mechanics approach. The value of αc depends
on the intensity σ of fluctuations of returns, as shown in Fig. 2. The region
α < αc is characterized by the condition H0 = 0, which means p
ω = Rω for
all ω ∈ Ω. This means that the market efficiently aggregates the information
dispersed across agents into the price. The efficient phase, where H0 = 0,
shrinks as σ increases. This is reasonable because as the fluctuations in Rω
increase, it becomes harder and harder for the agents to incorporate them
into prices.
In order to analyze how agents behave, as a function of α and σ, it is
useful to introduce the quantity
q1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
z+i − z−i
2
)2
. (8)
This measures how differently agents behave upon receiving the two different
signals, i.e. how much they use the signal they receive. This is plotted in
figure 3 as a function of α for σ = 1. First we observe that q1 increases as
12
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Figure 3: Parameter q1 in the competitive (full line, diamonds and circles)
and Nash equilibria (dashed line and squares). Lines present the graphs of
the analytical solution; diamonds and squares refer to numerical simulations
of systems with N = 200 agents and small learning rates. Averages are
taken over 100 realizations of disorder in the stationary state. The two
sets of simulations, in the competitive equilibria, refer to different initial
conditions: symmetric (diamonds) and asymmetric (circles).
αc is approached both from above or below, and that it displays a cusp at
αc. A second singularity appears at a larger value of α – called α+ – whose
behavior as a function of σ is also shown in Fig. 2. In the region [αc, α+)
agents invest a non-zero amount at most for one of the two signals they
receive. Actually in this region there is also a fraction φ of agents who do
not invest (z+i = z
−
i = 0) at all. This fraction increases as αc is approached
from above, suggesting that it becomes harder and harder for agents to find
profitable opportunities with Rω > pω, as α→ αc.
For α > α+, instead, all agents make positive investments under both
signals (z+i > 0 and z
−
i > 0). This sudden change manifests itself in the
singular behavior of q1 at α+. It is remarkable that a mixed state, with some
agents investing all the time and some others investing under one signal at
most, is not possible. As α increases, for α > αc, the information complexity
increases and the market becomes more and more inefficient. Prices follow
returns to some extent, in the sense that when Rω is larger than the average
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−R, the price pω is also larger than p. But the slope of a regression of pω−p
versus Rω −R is less than one and it vanishes as α−1 for α→∞.
As the complexity of fluctuations of returns increases, increasing α, the
partial information of agents becomes less and less useful. Hence for α→∞
one recovers the case without information, where pω = R, and H0 → ασ2
converges to the fluctuations of returns themselves.
From the agent’s point of view the equilibrium in the efficient phase
(α < αc) is not unique. This means that adaptive agents following the
above learning dynamics will end up in a states {zmi } which depends on
the initial conditions {Umi (t = 0)} (prices, of course, do not depend on the
initial condition, because pω = Rω for all ω ∈ Ω). This feature is captured
by the parameter
q0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
z+i − z−i
2
z′+i − z′−i
2
(9)
in the statistical mechanics approach, where zmi and z
′m
i represent two differ-
ent systems of agents, with different initial conditions. We find that q0 6= q1,
in general, for α < αc. Fig. 3 reports the value of q1 for symmetric initial
conditions Umi (0) = 0 for all i ∈ I and m ∈ M . This matches the results
of numerical simulations with those initial conditions but Fig. 3 also shows
that asymmetric initial conditions (Umi (0) = 10m for all i ∈ I and m = ±1)
yield a different value of q1 and hence a different equilibrium.
Market impact and Nash equilibria
The fact that the market impact ∂p
ω
∂zmi
of each agent is of order 1/N might
suggest that prices in the Nash equilibrium should be close to those in the
competitive equilibrium. More precisely one might expect that for every
ω, pωC − pωN = O(1/N) as in the case where agents have no information on
the state of nature that we have discussed above. For large N this is much
smaller than the distance between prices and returns because pωC − Rω =
O(1/
√
N) in the competitive equilibrium. This suggests that Nash equilibria
behaves similarly to competitive equilibria, and that the distinction vanishes
as N →∞.
This conclusion however is not correct when agents have private infor-
mation, as one can read from Eq. (6). Indeed, the term proportional to η
in Eq. (6), at the competitive equilibrium is of the same order in N of the
first term.
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In fact
|pC − pN | ≥ |pC −R| − |R− pN | ≥ 0
by the reverse triangle inequality (|pC −R| − |R− pN | ≥ 0 holds because pωC
is the feasible price closest to Rω). Fig. 1 shows that the right hand side
is finite. This contrast with the case of no information where |pc − pN | ∝
1/
√
N → 0 as N →∞. This case is only recovered in the limit α →∞, in
which |pC −R| − |R− pN | → 0 (see Fig. 1).
The second term of Eq. (6) dramatically changes the statistical behavior
of the market: i) the phase transition disappears: the distance between
prices pωN and returns R
ω smoothly decreases, as shown in figure 1, and
it vanishes as α → 0. ii) the equilibrium is unique in both prices and
investment for all α > 0. The asymptotic behavior of learning dynamics
does not depend on initial conditions. iii) Agents always invest at least
under one signal, for all α > 0. All agents who invest under both signals
invest, on average over the two signals, the same quantity6. iv) average price
p is lower than average return R, by a term of order 1/N . As a consequence,
the payoff of agents is not zero, as in competitive equilibria, but rather it is
proportional to 1/N .
Again as α→∞ the fluctuations of prices with ω die out. This explains
why, in that limit the price converges to the one without information. At
the same time, as α→∞ |pN −R|− |pC−R| → 0 and Nash prices converge
to competitive prices (see Fig. 1).
Learning rates and price volatility
Let us explore the dependence of the results discussed so far on the learning
rate Γ. In the limit Γ → 0 the dynamics is deterministic and hence prices
converge to equilibrium prices and the investment of agents also converges
to a fixed point equilibrium. When Γ > 0 the dynamics becomes stochastic
and fluctuations occur. These do not affect average prices 〈p|ω〉, which
attain their Γ → 0 value7. On the contrary, price volatility increases, as
6This is easily seen from the equilibrium condition, which requires δki,m(R − p) −
δki,m
zm
i
N
≤ 0 with the equality holding whenever zmi > 0. Taking the sum on m, we
find zkii /N = (R− p) for all agents who invest under both signals. The same conditions
imply that there cannot be an agent who never invests. Indeed if zmi = 0, it must be that
δki,m(R − p) ≤ 0. The sum on m gives (R − p) ≤ 0 which cannot be correct: agents will
never spend more that they get at equilibrium.
7The notation 〈. . .〉 is intended here for long time averages in the stationary state of
the dynamics. The symbol 〈. . . |ω〉 stands averages conditional on the state ω.
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Figure 4: Squared distance |R − 〈p〉 |2 of prices from returns for α = s = 1
as a function of Γ (circles). Price fluctuation δp2 are also plotted (squares).
Open symbols refer to Competitive equilibria whereas full symbols refer to
Nash equilibria.
shown in Fig. 4. For both Competitive and Nash equilibria we find that
the distance of average prices to returns |R−〈p〉 | stays remarkably constant
when Γ increases over two decades. On the contrary, price fluctuations
δp2 ≡∑ω 〈(p − 〈p|ω〉)2|ω〉 /Ω increase approximately linearly with Γ in the
same range.
Hence excess volatility arises in these model markets when agents react
too fast or strongly to price adjustments.
4 Conclusions
We have characterized the relative size of the market that gives at equi-
librium market efficiency. The economy we have considered is very simple:
there is only one asset. In addition, to simplify the analysis, we have con-
sidered the case of agents with unbounded wealth.
Our results generalize in a straightforward way to more general setups.
This is true in particular for the economies with many assets. As long as
agents have no budget constraint, they can invest independently in each asset
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separately. In other words agents do not introduce additional correlation in
the prices of different assets beyond those already present in the returns.
A Appendix: the statistical mechanics analysis
In order to study the minima of Hη, we introduce the partition function
Z(β) =
∫ ∞
0
dz+1
∫ ∞
0
dz−1 . . .
∫ ∞
0
dz+N
∫ ∞
0
dz−Ne
−βHη{zmi }.
The integrals, in the limit β → ∞ are dominated by the configurations
{zmi } for which Hη is minimal. The central quantity to compute is the free
energy fβ = −β−1 logZ(β). This has to be averaged over the realization
of the disorder {kωi , Rω}. One can reduce the problem of computing the
average 〈logZ(β)〉 of the logarithm to that of computing averages of mo-
ments 〈Zn(β)〉 by the identity logZ = limn→0(Zn − 1)/n. This is known as
the replica trick [9] because, for integer n, Zn(β) is the partition function
of n non-interacting replicas {zmi,1}, . . . , {zmi,n} of the system, with the same
realization of disorder. Taking the average over the disorder introduces an
effective interaction between replicas. The resulting expression is handled
in such a way as to be able to use saddle point methods to compute it in
the limit N,β → ∞. An assumption on the symmetry of the minima with
respect to permutation of replicas is necessary at this point. This symmetry
can be broken in case of multiple minima, because different replicas may end-
up in different minima. This is not our case because Hη is a non-negative
definite quadratic form. So the solution in our case is replica symmetric (see
[9] for more details). A more detailed discussion of these steps in the context
of a model of adaptive heterogeneous agents is given in Ref. [10].
The final result is that we can write
Ek,R
[
min
{zmi }
Hη
]
= lim
β→∞
min
q0,qˆ0,x,w,Rˆ
fβ(q0, qˆ0, x, w, Rˆ) (10)
where
fβ(q0, qˆ0, x, w, Rˆ) =
1
β
ln(1 + x) +
q0 + σ
2
1 + x
+
xqˆ0
α
− wq0
α
+
2Rˆ
α
− 2
αβ
∫ ∞
−∞
dt e−t
2/2
√
2pi
ln
∫
z≥0
d2ze−βVt(z)
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and, with z = (z¯ +∆, z¯ −∆)
Vt(z) =
w + αη
2
∆2 −
√
qˆ0t∆+
αη
2
z¯2 − Rˆz¯. (11)
Here x = β(q1 − q0) is a combination of the two order parameters whereas
qˆ0, w and Rˆ arise as auxiliary variables (Lagrange multipliers).
The minimization problem contains the statistical information on the
Gibbs probability distribution e−βHη over the space spanned by {zmi }, av-
eraged over all realizations of disorder. We refer the reader to ref. [9] for a
deeper discussion. Let it suffice to say that this probability distribution fac-
torizes over agents, which is typical of systems with mean field interaction.
Hence the probability that an agent invests fractions z ∈ A where A is any
subset of R2+, is given by
Prob{z ∈ A} =
∫
A
dz
∫ ∞
−∞
dt e−t
2/2
√
2pi
e−βVt(z
+,z−)∫
ζ≥0 d2ζe−βVt(ζ)
(12)
where the parameters of Vt are those which satisfy the five first order con-
ditions
∂fβ
∂q0
= 0,
∂fβ
∂qˆ0
= 0,
∂fβ
∂x = 0,
∂fβ
∂w = 0 and
∂fβ
∂Rˆ
= 0.
As β →∞, the integrals in Eq. (12) are dominated by the minimum z∗
of Vt(z) in R
2. The calculation leading to the final result are lengthy. We
just report the final result.
A.1 The case of η = 0
When η = 0 a degeneracy of solutions occurs for α < αc. In other words,
H0 does not attain its minimum at a single isolated point, but rather on
a connected set of points. Each point is the equilibrium of a market with
some initial condition. As one varies the initial conditions, the equilibrium
moves on the set.
The statistical mechanics approach takes an uniform average over all
the points of this set. The results derived in this way, do not describe any
particular market equilibrium, but rather a uniform distribution of equilibria
resulting from some distribution of initial conditions. Since the mapping
between initial conditions and equilibria is not known, it is not clear what
exactly the statistical mechanics approach describes.
There is way out, in these kind of situations, which is to introduce a
term in the functional to be minimized which breaks the degeneracy and
selects one point in the set. In the limit when the strength of this term
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vanishes, one recovers the statistical properties of the original system in the
selected equilibrium. The η term is exactly of this form. Furthermore it is
a perturbation which preserves the symmetries of the system (ki → −ki for
some i). With η = 0+ we then expect to find the properties of markets with
symmetric initial conditions (U+i (0) = U
−
i (0)).
The solution for η = 0+ takes a parametric form. Let us define the
functions
ψr(τ) =
√
2
pi
e−τ
2/2 − τerfc(τ/
√
2)
ψq(τ) = (1 + τ
2)erfc(τ/
√
2)−
√
2
pi
τe−τ
2/2
ψx(τ) = erfc(τ/
√
2).
For τ ∈ [0, τc], where τc is the solution of ψq(τ) + σ2ψr(τ) = ψx(τ) we
have
α = ψq(τ) + σ
2ψr(τ)
q0 =
ψq(τ)
ψ2r (τ)
|R− p| = ψq(τ) + σ
2ψr(τ)− ψx(τ)
ψr(τ)
which holds in the interval α ∈ [αc, 1 + 2piσ2], where αc = α(τc). Notice
that H → 0 as α→ αc.
For α ∈ [(1 + 2piσ2)−1, αc] we find
α =
ψx(τ)
ψq(τ) + σ2ψr(τ)
q0 =
ψq(τ)
ψ2r (τ)
|R− p| = 0
again for τ ∈ [0, τc].
In these two regions, a fraction φ = erf(τ/
√
2) of agents never invests,
whereas the others invest only under at most one signal. The fraction φ is
largest at the critical point αc, i.e. for τ = τc.
Outside this region we find an explicit solution: For α ≥ 1 + 2piσ2, we
find q0 = 1/α and |R−p| = (1−1/α)
√
1 + ασ2. Hence the bare fluctuations
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of returns |R − 1| =
√
ασ2 are recovered in this limit. In the region α ≤
1/(1+ 2piσ
2) we find q0 = α and |R−p| = 0. Agents invest under both signals
and the distribution of their average investment (z++ z−)/2 is exponential.
A.2 The case of η = 1
The study of the minimum of the potential Vt(z) is quite different in this
case. One has to distinguish two regions of integration of t, according to
whether the minimum of Vt(z) belongs to R
2
+ or not. The first case describes
agents who invest under both signals, and our solution confirms that they all
invest on average the same amount. The second case describes the fraction
of agents who only invest once.
The solution again depends parametrically on τ and on a parameter
y ∈ [1, 2] which satisfies the equation:
1− I0(τ)
1 + y
=
(2− y)(y − 1)
y
{
1− I0(τ) + [I1(τ)− τ ]τ + 2I0(τ)y
(1 + y)2
+
σ2[τ + (I1(τ) + τ − I0(τ)τ)y]2
(1 + y)2
}
with I0(τ) = erfc(τ/
√
2) and I1(τ) =
√
2/pie−τ
2/2. We have
q0 =
(1 + y)2 + τ2 − (1 + 2y)I0(τ)− τI1(τ)
[τ(1 + y)− yτI0(τ) + yI1(τ)]
α = (q0 + σ
2)
{
(y − 1)[τ(1 + y)− yτI0(τ) + yI1(τ)]
y(1 + y)
}2
|R− p| = (q0 + σ2)(y − 1)2
[
τ
y
− τI0(τ)− I1(τ)
1 + y
]
This has two solutions y± for τ > τ0, which describe the low and high α
regions. There is no singularity or discontinuity in the solution when τ → τ0
(corresponding to α ≈ 0.502 . . . for σ2 = 1). The fraction of agents playing
only once is given by I0(τ).
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